In the two years since President Duterte assumed office, we have seen better relations with China due to the decision not to emphasize the territorial disputes and to instead focus on strengthening economic cooperation. In particular, the country’s economic managers have been very gung ho in attracting Chinese investments and contracting Chinese financing to support the administration’s Build Build Build! infrastructure program. Meanwhile, our fishermen have returned to their fishing grounds in Panatag Shoal, the Armed Forces are able to conduct repairs on their occupied features, and not just the optics but the actual atmosphere of political ties have tremendously improved. China is actively wooing Philippine support for its Belt and Road Initiative, even offering to relax immigration controls to allow in Filipino English-language teachers and – possibly in the future – caregivers and household service workers. China has also become the Philippines’ second largest source of tourists.

However, not all is going smoothly and there are strong undercurrents threatening to create new waves of tensions between the two sides.

The problem relates in part to the country’s continuing political polarization that pits the pro-Duterte camp against the supporters of Aquino. Poor management of the China policy shift during the political transition -- particularly the sudden pendulum swing from Aquino’s confrontational stance against Beijing to the opposite but equally extreme direction of perceived submission by Duterte – has left many citizens confused as to what the country’s interests and strategies in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) ultimately are. The incumbent president’s exaggerated fondness for China and trust in its leaders’ assurances are not likely to be shared by the majority of the citizens, which is not surprising given the continuing island construction and military build-up China proceeds to undertake. Duterte is accused of wasting the opportunity to draw political gains from the hard-earned legal victory in the arbitration case filed by Aquino, even as the expected windfall in Chinese economic largesse that he promised has also failed to translate thus far into tangible development benefits. In this light, pressure is building up from partisan groups, legal pundits, foreign policy analysts, the general public, and even segments of the bureaucracy demanding that this government account for the lack of progress in defending WPS interests.

But the pressure on Duterte is not just confined to domestic stakeholders. The shift in Philippine policy has helped trigger a chain reaction on the part of other claimant states (particularly Vietnam), ASEAN countries, neighbors like Japan and Australia, and even a major power like the United States. Because of the Philippines’ abandonment of its frontline role in the South China Sea and China’s perceived rejection of a rules-based approach to managing the disputes, these other states were forced to step up their own initiatives in responding to an increasingly robust Chinese presence and influence.

An arms race is now said to be taking place in Southeast Asia, in anticipation of the confrontations to come. Some countries have moved to strengthen bilateral cooperation directed at building defense and maritime law enforcement capabilities of weaker neighbors. The so-called “Quad” – a four-party security arrangement involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States that was first touted many years ago – was recently re-established to act as a balance to China’s growing influence. Of even greater significance was that the US government in an official document labeled China its “strategic competitor” and began to launch more frequent naval exercises, signaling tougher times ahead. US president Donald Trump redefined his country’s approach to security by prominently touting the “Indo-Pacific” concept, giving India – the other Asian power – pride of place as a full stakeholder in what used to be the “Asia-Pacific”.

Clearly, despite the major consequences of the radical shift in Philippine foreign policy towards China, the security dynamics in the region do not entirely or even significantly depend on what Duterte says and does with his China policy. But the reverse is true: the success of Duterte’s China policy in achieving greater security and access to resources of the WPS are tied to factors well beyond the Philippines’ control. The first factor is China’s own determination to become a maritime great power and its apparent hopes to establish itself at the apex of a new regional hierarchy. This is bound to test relations with all of its neighbors, who are just as as jealous of their own sovereignty and autonomy. The second is the brewing economic and security competition between the world’s two biggest economies and military powers – the United States and China -- with the Indo-Pacific as its arena and the South China Sea the central stage of this arena. The Philippines, a US ally for close to 70 years, will be caught in the crossfire.

Unless the Duterte government takes cognizance of both the domestic public sentiment and the new regional realities, and until it is ready to build a more sophisticated approach grounded on political inclusiveness (domestically) and collective concerns (i.e. ASEAN, regional security complexes), its “China strategy” – assuming there is one – will be headed for a free fall.

Aileen S.P. Baviera is the President and CEO of Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress. She is also a Professor at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines and editor-in-chief of the journal Asian Politics & Policy.

This article was first published as an Editor's Note for Pathways to Progress' Newsletter 2018 Issue #1. To view the original article, click here.