Can a South China Sea code of conduct help ensure regional stability? Here are four ways it could be strengthened
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Aaron Jed Rabena
The China-Philippines Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012, the China-Vietnam oil-rig incident in 2014, China’s island-building and militarisation operations, the Philippines’ Permanent Court of Arbitration landmark victory in 2016 and the regular US-led freedom of navigation operations all highlight the inefficacy of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea and the complex interplay of economic, environmental, legal, political and strategic issues.
Strategic Insight is a collection of original commentaries by APPFI’s in-house analysts covering 2018 developments in Philippine foreign relations. The individual essays have been published and may also be accessed on the Commentaries section on this website.
It has now been a little more than two years since the ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity 2025 was introduced. It seemed that, following years of calls for increased investment, ASEAN as an organization has recognized the need for regional infrastructure to enable closer economic and social linkages between the member states. The current plan, an update over the 2011 version, has a firm footing in global connectivity trends and a more focused agenda. Compared to the first plan, which had a bit of a wish-list character, the current connectivity plan has been well-received, particularly by ASEAN’s external partners.
US-China Rivalry and the Philippines’ National Security Strategy
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Mico A. Galang
The year 2018 witnessed an intensification of the geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, particularly between the United States (US) and China. In January 2018, the Pentagon released the summary of the classified National Defense Strategy (NDS). Along with Russia, the NDS identified China as one of the “revisionist powers.” Overall, the NDS provides that Beijing’s objective is to “reorder the Indo-Pacific region to [its] advantage,” as well as the “displacement of the [US] to achieve global preeminence in the future.” Thus far, China appears to be taking geopolitical steps to achieve these strategic objectives.
Despite an international ruling that largely debunked China’s maritime claims, Beijing continued with beefing up its artificial islands in the South China Sea (SCS). This year alone, China installed, among others, anti-ship cruise missiles and surface to-air missile systems, as well as jamming equipment. In May 2018, China landed bombers in the Paracels, the range of which includes practically the entire Philippines. Washington responded by conducting more freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the region. In September 2018, the US and China were nearly in a literal collision when the guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur, conducting a FONOP, was approached by a PRC Luyang destroyer and “conducted a series of increasingly aggressive maneuvers accompanied by warnings for [USS Decatur] to depart the area.” The US further added that the PRC destroyer “approached within 45 yards of [USS Decatur’s] bow, after which [USS Decatur] maneuvered to prevent a collision.” On the economic front, Washington and Beijing are engulfed in a trade war.
