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A Toxic Relationship. Philippines-China relations have been rocky under the Aquino government. Aquino brought the dispute to the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration, strengthened ties with the United States through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and refused to hold bilateral talks related to the maritime dispute. Such actions have of course embarrassed and antagonized China, turning Philippines-China relations into its current toxic state.
Renewed Hope? The electoral triumph of President Rodrigo Duterte has led many to think that this forebodes the betterment of relations. During his campaign, he had expressed willingness to hold bilateral talks and cooperate with China. His initial statements insinuated that he preferred holding direct negotiatons with China and shelving issues of sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea, in exchange for economic privileges China can offer the country. His statements were welcomed by China; upon the announcement of his victory, Chinese ambassador Zhao Jianhua was among the first to congratulate Duterte stating their hope for better relations under the new administration. China also highly encouraged the Philippines to settle the disputes bilaterally and to drop the case, as China would not adhere to the arbitration results. For China, the election of Duterte is an opportunity to carry on the bilateral consultations and negotiations that they had repeatedly failed to persuade President Aquino to pursue.
Duterte’s stance in the dispute is however complex. Despite being vocal about his preference for amicable ties with China, as President-elect he also said that he plans to wait for the arbitration results and expects China to follow the ruling. This is contradictory to China’s position of not recognizing the arbitration. In a phone call with US President Obama before his inaguration, Duterte stated that he would continue the previous administration’s multilateral approach to the disputes, even including the United States, Japan and Australia. His openness to bilateral talks, he expounded, would depend on the failure or success of multilateral negotiations in a span of 2 to 3 years. Addressing China, he added, “You want to talk? OK. You want joint exploration? OK. You don’t claim it, and we won’t claim it.”
The imminent release of arbitration results on July 12 has made both China and the Philippines skittish. Despite his earlier statements, the Philippine president said that if the arbitration goes in favor of the Philippines, it will be a moral victory, although he acknowledges that it will also put the country in an awkward position. Duterte has also said that the Philippines is not prepared to go to war over the South China Sea, hence he wants to talk with China “after getting the copy of the arbitral judgment”. Duterte moreover said he would not “taunt or flaunt” a favorable ruling.
On July 6, China released a statement once again stressing that the arbitration is “illegal, null and void from the outset” and its hope that the Duterte administration will “veer away from the wrong path taken by the former government, return to the right track of having dialogue and consultation with China”. How the Duterte administration will use the arbitration as a leverage in its bilateral talks with China has yet to be seen.
The United States Factor. The US is another key player to be considered in the South China Sea dispute. American military forces have been deployed in the area as part of its ‘rebalancing’ to Asia policy, commitment to ensuring protection of freedom of navigation, and as a response to its allies’ call to action in the South China Sea, but the elected Philippine president has expressed qualms regarding the United States. Duterte had earlier on declared that he would not be reliant on the US regarding the dispute. “We will be chartering a course of our own. It will not be dependent on America, and it will be a line not intended to please anybody but the Filipino interest,” he said.
The Philippines and US are both bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty which states that “each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." However, the United States has a complicated relationship with China. Despite its military deployment and efforts to draw the support of the international community against China’s assertive actions in the disputed area, the United States and China have to preserve their strategic relations for the sake of their shared interests.
Duterte had also expressed concern over how much the US would be willing to stake for its ally, should the arbitration ruling be favorable for the Philippines and should he start acting on it. “Are you with us or not (with us)?”, he asked US Ambassador Philip Goldberg. For the US’ part, former US ambassador to the Philippines and US-Philippines Society co-chairman John Negroponte, at a forum with the Philippine business community, assured the Philippines of continued American support in trade, investments as well as security.
Finding the Balance. The South China Sea dispute is often labeled as a potential flashpoint not only among its claimants but increasingly between the United States and China. As China and the US struggle for power and influence in the region, the Philippines -- an ally of the US that has ‘unintentionally’ antagonized its neighbor China -- is in a precarious position. Rebalancing our relations with China and the United States will be among the great challenges Duterte will face as a President. He will not adopt the same assertive pushback strategy employed by his predecessor, nor can he bandwagon with China.
The more practical strategy would be to hedge among the great powers. In international relations, hedging is the middle position between the hardline stances of balancing and bandwagoning. Hedging states avoid or forestall having to choose one side at the expense of the other. In hedging, there is continued engagement between the state and the greater power/s, while at the same time, it may pursue deterrence, defense strengthening, or building diplomatic, economic, and political relationships with third parties that can be converted into leverage against the target state when relations with it deteriorate.1 In this case, the Philippines may continue to enjoy the benefits of engaging both China and the United States, while at the same time strengthening our military and our relations with ASEAN and other middle powers – providing flexibility and assurance in our foreign policy.
Circumstances under the Aquino administration may have brought the Philippines to a closer relationship with the US, but the triumph of Duterte gives the country an opportunity to recalibrate our relationship with China and be reminded that our relationship need not entirely revolve around the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea dispute.
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1 Goh, Evelyn. Understanding “Hedging” in Asia Pacific Security. PacNet. Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2006.