Since the start of Battle for Marawi in late May 2017, attention has tended to focus on the development of a stronger partnership between Australia and the Philippines in the areas of counter-terrorism and enhanced training for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). But in parallel, there have been significant developments in bilateral cooperation on maritime security, as the Philippines Navy (PN) acquires new assets and seeks to develop new capabilities. This paper explores the evolution of that element of the evolving defense and security partnership between Australia and the Philippines and the drivers of closer ties. It observes that not only is there a growing intensity in bilateral maritime security cooperation, but also that there has been a shift from non-traditional to more traditional, harder-edged, activities.

Background

The framework in which this maritime security cooperation takes place is made up of three key agreements: the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperative Defense Activities; the Philippines-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), signed in 2007, which was ratified and came into force in 2012; and the 2015 Comprehensive Partnership agreement. A fourth – a logistics support agreement – was promised in the Comprehensive Partnership declaration but has not yet been agreed. The 1995 MoU created a Joint Defense Cooperation Committee to coordinate activities, while the 2012 SOFVA brought into being a set of legal arrangements to facilitate those activities. The 2015 Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership, for its part, observed past and ongoing cooperation, including high-level dialogue, but was vague about the specifics of future plans, other than floating the idea of the logistics agreement.

Within this framework, a number of maritime security initiatives have developed, alongside Australian Defense Force (ADF) and AFP involvement in army, air force, and joint exercises. The most of important of these is the annual Maritime Training Activity LUMBAS, involving the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Philippine Navy (PN), which began in the early 2000s. In the past, LUMBAS has focused on a range of activities, including ship-to-ship communication, humanitarian and disaster relief, anti-piracy, anti-narcotics, and managing a number of other contingencies.

In science it is noted that terrestrial planets are situated in the “Goldilocks zone,” that is, the habitable or life zone in space where a planet is just the “right distance from a home star so that its surface is neither too hot nor too cold.” The Goldilocks zone in a galaxy thus allows life to develop and flourish. For decades the Australia-Philippines strategic relationship has been characterized by missed opportunities and strategic inertia. When the bilateral relationship has developed it has generally been through slow incremental engagement that, at times, has easily and quickly gone cold. However, the recent the terrorist attack on Marawi in the southern Philippines has injected new energy into the strategic dimensions of this bilateral relationship. Marawi, along with changing regional dynamics, has potentially opened up a “Goldilocks zone” movement in the Australia-Philippines strategic relationship, one in which the partnership could develop and flourish. The ability to capitalize on this recent rapid progress, however, could still easily stagnate especially as domestic politics in the Philippines could easily get too hot, burning the burgeoning relationship, or Australia could easily become distracted from its engagement letting the pace of progress stagnate or go cold. This means that the window of opportunity to cement a much deeper and more coherent bilateral partnership remains narrow. If not seized quickly this opportunity could easily prove to be fleeting.

China continues to be aggressive in pursuing its maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, despite the verdict given by the Arbitral Tribunal in 2016. President Xi Jinping, in his meeting with President Rodrigo Duterte on 29 August 2019, reiterated that China does not recognize the ruling. The June 9 ‘maritime incident’ – wherein a Chinese vessel rammed and destroyed a Filipino fishing boat and left the area leaving the fishermen floundering at sea - should not be seen in isolation, but rather, analyzed in the larger scheme of things.

The Philippines and China as members of the international community are expected to behave appropriately in accordance with recognized international norms. Both countries are also parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the principal legal framework accepted by states, which codified long-standing customs and norms in the sea. The view that international law is supposed to provide important guidelines to govern the conduct of states is an ideal. In the June 9 maritime incident, China violated UNCLOS Article 98 “Duty to Render Assistance” paragraph 1c. That is indeed a serious violation but realistically speaking, who or what international body is out to punish China? There is none.

... Australia is another security partner of the Philippines that extended immediate and urgent assistance to the AFP during the battle of Marawi. Australia sent two Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C Orion aircrafts to provide surveillance and reconnaissance support to the AFP’s combat operation against Muslim militants who took control of the city. Signal and photographic intelligence provided by the American and Australian reconnaissance planes enabled the AFP to deploy its FA-50s fighter planes and OV-10 ground attack planes to launch surgical airstrikes on the ISIS’ positions in the city. During the fighting, Australia has also considered sending Australian Defense Force (ADF) personnel to the Philippines to advise and assist the AFP in its counter-terrorism campaign against the Islamic militants—something that the ADF has been doing in Iraq. In the aftermath of the battle, Australia has been looking at further collaboration and capacity-building work with the Philippines and other regional partners on fostering cooperation among regional coast guards to tighten border control in the Sulu Sea to limit the movement of money, technology, and fighters to extremist groups in the Southern Philippines.

This commentary examines the Philippines’ efforts to connect the separate US bilateral alliances in the Indo-Pacific region as it forges a security partnership with Australia. It explores this main question: how does the Philippines establish and foster a security partnership with Australia? It also raises the following corollary questions: what are the Philippines’ motives in pursuing security partnerships with Australia and other US allies? What are the limits of the Philippine-Australia security partnership?